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Muhammad Masum Billah* Incentive Effect of Liability Rules in
the Presence of Liability Insurance
in, the Maritime Law Context:
An Economic Analysis
Incentive effect of liability law may be affected by the presence of liability
insurance. Apparently when a party has liability insurance and does not have to
pay directly from its own pocket, it will have less motivation to exercise proper
care. This tendency of an insured is known as "moral hazard." There are many
studies on the problem of "moral hazard" and on various mechanisms how to
address it. Yet, there is a lack of academic discussion on comparative analysis
between liability law and liability insurance in terms of their effect on creation
of incentives; that is, whether liability law alone induces best care or whether
liability insurance with its various incentive mechanisms leads to better care. Of
course, liability insurance cannot exist without liability law This paper argues that
the presence of liability insurance produces better incentives towards care than
liability law alone.
Les effets incitatifs du droit de la responsabilit6 peuvent 6tre affect6s par I'existence
d'assurance responsabilit6 civile. Quand une partie a souscrit une assurance
responsabilit6 civile et n'a pas J payer de sa poche, elle n'a qu'une motivation
r6duite de prendre les precautions ad6quates. Cette tendance 6 la negligence
chez les assures est appelee - risque moral .. II existe de nombreuses etudes
sur le problemd de, risque moral et sur les divers mecanismes utilises pour le
resoudre. Malgr6 cela, il y a absence de discussion th6orique sur une analyse
comparative du droit de la responsabilit6 et de I'assurance responsabilitd pour
ce qui est de leur incidence sur la creation de mesures incitatives; c'est-a-dire,
la responsabilit6 seule incite-t-elle 1 prendre les meilleures pr6cautions possible,
ou I'assurance responsabilit6 et ses diverses mesures incitatives menent-elles
J am6liorer les precautions en place? Lassurance responsabilit6 civile ne peut
6videmment pas exister en .'absence de droit de la responsabilit6. Selon I'auteur,
I'existence d'assurance responsabilitd a comme corollaire de meilleures mesures
d'incitation i la prudence que la responsabilit6 seule.
* LL.D. candidate, University of Ottawa; LL.M. (Alberta); LL.B. (Int. Islamic University
Malaysia). I would like to thank my LL.D. supervisor, Professor Andr6 Bradn, for his comments on
the paper. I would also like to acknowledge financial support from Faculty of Law and Faculty of
Graduate and Post-doctoral Studies, University of Ottawa, to present an earlier version of the paper at
the I st Annual Graduate Conference of Toronto Group for the Study of International, Transnational,
and Comparative Law, University of Toronto, in January 2008.
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Introduction
1. Liability law and liability insurance in an ideal and in not-so-ideal
worlds
1. No liability law and liability insurance in a perfect world
2. There would be both liability law and liability insurance in the
real world
3. Presence of actual liability indicates failure of liability law to
induce optimal care
II. Why liability insurance may lead to better care
1. Insurers possess superior information on optimal care
a. Information on the m&gnitude
b. Information on the probability of loss
c. Information on the cost of care
2. Various legal principles strengthen insurers' informational
advantage
a. Duty to disclose material facts
b. Insurance warranties
3. Various insurance mechanisms create stronger financial
incentives
a. Premium rate-variance
b. Deductibles
c. Liability ceiling or upward limit
d. Franchise clause
e. Uninsured warranty
f. Policy exceptions/exclusions
g. Duty to mitigate loss (sue and labour)
4. Negligence in the presence of insurance may be more costly
a. Insurance premium theoretically equals the expected
liability
b. Insurance premium may be more or less than the pre-
insurance expected liability
5. Additional reasons why insurance may lead to better care
a. Insurance facilitates research and innovation on loss
reduction
b. Insurance also helps insureds to know better about optimal
care
c. Insurer 's failure to create incentives may affect the very
survival of its business
III. Empirical evidence
1. Marine insurance
2. Non-marine insurance
Conclusion
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Introduction
The main questions examined in this paper are whether liability insurance
is a complementary force in the incentive effect of liability law and, if so,
whether insurance can lead to better incentives than liability law alone.,
Apparently when a potentially liable party does not have to pay directly
from its2 own pocket due to the fact that it has insurance, it will have
less motivation to exercise proper care. This phenomenon is known in the
insurance literature as "moral hazard"3 i.e., the tendency of an insured to
relax precaution levels against potential loss or liability. However, there
are various insurance and legal mechanisms to prevent the problem of
moral hazard.4 Insurance mechanisms provide financial incentives through
premium rate variance and coverage restrictions, while legal mechanisms
strengthen the existing informational advantage of an insurer. Superior
information helps an insurer to determine more accurately than the courts
the expected loss/liability5 from insured activities and then to decide what
the optimal care would be to prevent such loss. The ability to create strong
financial incentives through insurance mechanisms gives an insurer
leverage to influence the precautionary steps taken by the insured and to
bring actual care closer to optimal care. Thus liability insurance can be a
complementary force in the realization of the functional goal of liability
law in creating incentives towards optimal care.6 In fact, the existence of
I. Prof. Fleming James asked the same questions in sixty years ago in his article "Accident Liability
Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance" (1948) 57 Yale L. J. 549 at 557 [James, "Accident
Liability Reconsidered"]. Although my answer to the questions coincide with his, his answers were
mainly based on some empirical evidence to the effect that accident rates have dropped in some areas
where liability insurance is available. See ibid. at 557-563. 1, on the other hand, have undertaken a
comparative analysis of informational strength of courts and liability insurers and that of the financial
incentives of liability law and insurance mechanisms to induce potentially liable insureds to take
precautions. I have also used some empirical evidence.
2. As both an insured (shipowner) and insurer are usually corporations in maritime liability context,
I will use gender-neutral pronouns to refer to them.
3. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Distributing Risk: Insurance, Legal Theory, and Public Policy
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986) at 14 [Abraham, Distributing Risk]. See also K. J. Arrow,
."Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care" (1963) 53 Am. Econ. Rev. 941 at 961-62;
M. Pauly, "The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment" (1968) 58 Am. Econ. Rev. 531 at 535 [Pauly,
"The Economics of Moral Hazard"].
4. The insurance mechanisms include rate variance, deductibles, policy limit, policy exceptions,
etc., while insurance law prevents moral hazard through the duty of disclosure in contract pre-
formation stage, insurance warranties, and principles of insurable interest and of indemnity, among
others.
5. A defendant's liability usually equals the loss suffered by the plaintiffs. I will, therefore, use the
words "loss" and "liability" interchangeably unless expressly stated otherwise.
6. In the presence of widespread accident and liability insurance, the main justification of liability
law lies in its deterrence effect on negligent conduct and not in compensation of victims. See Steven
Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004) at
267-269 [Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis].
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liability insurance may lead a potentially liable insured to exercise better
care and solicitude than what would be the case with liability law alone, the
main reasons being better information possessed by insurers and stronger
financial incentives created by insurance mechanisms. Other reasons
include possible higher price paid by the insureds for being negligent in the
presence of insurance than in its absence, development of better preventive
techniques through insurers' research and innovation, likelihood of better
education on loss-prevention by the insureds in the presence of insurance,
and the dependence of the very survival of an insurer's business on its
ability to prevent moral hazard.
In Part I, I discuss briefly the interplay between liability law and
liability insurance both in an ideal and in the actual world. Part II contains
arguments in support of the main proposition of the paper that liability
insurers can induce better incentives in the mind of potentially liable
insured parties towards care than can the courts with the liability law
alone, while Part III presents some empirical evidence on the validity
of the proposition. Although the issue pertains to every area of liability
law and insurance, the paper will analyze the question in the context of
maritime liability and marine insurance.7
I. Liability law and liability insurance in an ideal and in not-so-ideal
worlds
1. No liability law and liability insurance in a perfect world
In a world of perfect information and costless transactions, there would
arise no need for liability law or, consequently, for liability insurance. It
takes two parties for a liability to exist. In the perfect world, whenever
the benefit from the prevention or reduction of a loss through care is more
7. Like any form of insurance, marine insurance is a means to manage risk through distribution of
risk over a large number insureds ('interpersonal spreading') and/or through shifting the individual
insured's future risk to the insurer in exchange of present premium ('inter-temporal spreading').
See Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1970) at 42-43 [Calabresi, The Costs ofAccidents]. It is noteworthy that insurance
is only one of many means to manage risk. Other risk management strategies include personal saving,
diversification, contract for future goods and serv,:es. and safety precautions: Abraham, Distributing
Risk, supra note 3 at 2, 67. Risk management through marine insurance involves protection against
the loss of a ship (hull insurance), its potential earning capacity (freight insurance), its onboard cargo
(cargo or liability insurance, depending on who bears the burden of cargo loss), and protection against
liability arising from the operation of the ship (liability insurance). Marine insurance can be further
divided on the basis of duration of coverage into time and voyage policies and on the basis of the
amount of coverage into valued and unvalued policies.
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than the cost of care,8 care will be taken regardless of liability law.9 If the
.victims could exercise such care, they would naturally do so because there
would be a net benefit for them. If it is the injurers who could take care,
the victims would pay the injurers to use care. This approach is supported
by the "Coase Theorem.""0 For example, if only a carrier can prevent cargo
loss by taking care or can do so at a lesser cost than that of a shipper, the
shipper would pay the carrier to take precautions if the default rule is that
losses lie where they fall. On the other hand, when only the shipper can
prevent the loss or its cost of doing so is less, it will take the necessary
preventive measures. Even if the default rule is changed to the shipper's
favour by shifting responsibility for any loss of or damage to the cargo
from the shipper to the carrier, the carrier will pay the shipper to take care.
Similar transactions would occur in other areas of maritime liability law
including liability for oil pollution, or personal injury and death aboard a
ship; the party who could eliminate or reduce the loss or could do so at a
lesser cost would take care regardless of liability law. By our assumption,
the parties know who between them is the "cheaper cost avoider" and they
can reach mutually beneficial agreements without any transaction cost. As
there would be no need for liability law in such a world, the question of
liability insurance would not even arise.
2. There would be both liability law and liability insurance in the real
world
In the real world, there would arise the need for both liability law and
liability insurance due to the lack of information and cost of transaction."
For example, prior to an oil pollution incident, there could not possibly
be any transaction between a tanker owner and potential victims of oil
pollution because of the lack of and/or cost of information to identify each
other. Even if they are able to identify each other, they may not engage in
8. See R.A. Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost" (1960) 3 J. L. & Econ. I [Coase, "The Problem
of Social Cost"]. An optimal care may also demand the reduction of activity level, when due to
"diminishing marginal utility" the benefit from an additional activity becomes less than its social cost.
Courts, however, rarely count activity level in determining due care. I will, therefore, limit the scope
of care to the way in which an activity is conducted and not its level. See Shavell, Foundations of
Economic Analysis, supra note 6 at 193-98.
9. For simplicity of analysis, I assume here that optimal care occurs when care is taken only by
that party who can prevent or reduce the loss at cheaper cost. There are situations where optimal care
would require both parties to take care at the same time. For discussion on unilateral and bilateral care
situations, see Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis ofAccident Lar (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1987) at 9-18 [Shavell, Economic Analysis ofAccident Law].
10. Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost," supra note 8.
11. See generally Calabresi, The Costs ofAccidents, supra note 7 at 135-38.
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a negotiation because of the prohibitively high cost of doing so.'2 In the
highly unlikely event of negotiation, the negotiation may not result in an
agreement on the possible cost of care and on who should bear such cost
because of the problems of "hold-out," "free-loading,"' 3 and 'free-riding'. 14
In some situations such as in contracts of carriage, 5 the parties know each
other, they negotiate, and reach agreements about the transportation of
goods. Yet they may still fail to arrive at an agreement on taking optimal
care because either they may have different views on the cost of care
(information asymmetry) or, even if their views are similar, one party
may not pay the other for taking care due to the inability of the former
to observe and verify the care taken by the latter. These shortcomings of
market transactions or of information asymmetry may be overcome by
imposing legal liability on the party who could take optimal care. 16
In the ideal situation, mere existence of liability rule should suffice
to induce optimal care because an optimal care implies that the cost
of care is less than the benefit from preventing or reducing the loss or
liability. However, the benefit in the form of complete prevention or partial
reduction of loss/liability is not usually a definite figure but a "probability-
discounted" or an expected amount. 7 The cost of care, on the other hand, is
certain. A potentially liable party would take care if and only if it thinks, or
better yet, knows that the expected benefit from its care is high enough as
to justify the sure cost of care. For example, if the party knows that taking
care at a cost of $100 would reduce the likelihood of a loss of $1,000
12. Such cost includes time and efforts and would likely to outweigh the possible benefit. See
Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis, supra note 6 at 87-89.
13. Both the 'hold-out' (i.e., asking more than reasonable price) and "free-loading" (offering less
than reasonable price) problems arise in a "bilateral monopoly" situation, i.e., when the parties (e.g.,
the polluters and victims of pollution) have no other option but to negotiate only with each other in
order to arrive at their desired agreement. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, "Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral" (1972) 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 at
1106; Calabresi, The Costs ofAccidents, supra note 7 at 137, n. 4; Shavell, Foundations of Economic
Analysis, ibid. at 91-92.
14. I.e., benefiting from the negotiation of others without personally participating and incurring the
cost. This mainly occurs when the number of plaintiffs/defendants is large and the individual benefit
from such negotiation is small. Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis, ibid. at 88.
15. Lack of due care, or negligence (a tort) can occur in many contractual situations, such as
employment contract, contract to buy foods or to receive medical treatment etc. See Richard A. Posner,
Economic Analysis of Law, 6th ed. (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2003) at 171-72 [Posner, Economic
Analysis of Law].
16. Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost," supra note 8 at 15-16. Besides liability, there are other
legal rules such as regulations, corrective tax, and subsidy to address the market's failure to arrive at
mutually beneficial agreement. For various legal rules and their comparative strengths see Shavell,
Foundations of Economic Analysis, supra note 6 at 92-101; Calabresi, The Costs ofAccidents, supra
note 7 at ch. 5 and 6.
17. Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis, ibid. at 177-178.
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by 20 percent (say, from 50 to 30 percent), it would take care because
the expected benefit in the form of reduction of loss/liability would be
$200 (20 percent reduction multiplied by $1,000). As the cost of care in
this example is less than the gain in terms of expected liability, taking
care here is cost-efficient. Failure to take care in such a situation would
amount to negligence.' In other words, negligence occurs in the failure of
a defendant to take reasonable precautions when the cost of doing so is less
than the cost of accident, discounted by the probability of its happening. 9
Being a rational individual, a potentially liable person would take care
and, consequently, there would not be any actual imposition of liability.
20
As we will see shortly in Part II, courts may err in their determination of
expected loss and optimal care. As a result, there would be both liability
and liability insurance in the real world.
3. Presence of actual liability indicates failure of liability law to induce
optimal care
In a negligence-based liability setting, the fact that a party is liable means
it breached its duty of care, i.e., it did not take reasonable care. 2' When a
party does not exercise reasonable care despite the presence of liability
law, liability law has failed to create incentives in the mind of that party.
The failure of the liability system to create incentives may occur due to
the possibility of escape by a potential liable party from liability for some
18. In United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 at 173 (2d Cir. 1947), Judge Learned Hand
held that not taking care amounts to negligence when B < PL where B is the cost of precaution, P
probability and L magnitude of loss. In economic analysis of law literature this is known as "Hand
Formula." See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra note 15 at 168.
19. Although courts do not calculate the cost of optimal care and the expected liability in
mathematical terms, most of the time courts' rulings on negligence will roughly approximate such
calculation. Courts' determination of reasonable care in negligence settings will-vary with cost of care
and the risk of harm arising from the lack of care. The greater the harm or the higher its likelihood,
the higher would be the standard of reasonable care. For example, in a narrow channel where the
probability of accident is high, the standard of reasonable care would be correspondingly high. Care
in such a situation includes reducing speed (slow navigation means more time to transport goods,
which translates into more cost for a carrier), and employing local pilots (thus incurring the pilotage
fees). See The Alletta, [1965] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 479 (where a master's failure to use the service of a pilot
caused an accident; the niaster was held negligent, even though pilotage was not compulsory); see also
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law ibid. at 169-170.
20. See Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, "Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts" (1972) 81
Yale L. J. 1055 at 1058 [Calabresi & Hirschoff, "Test for Strict Liability"].
21. This assumes that courts or jurors are not erring in holding the party liable despite its exercise of
reasonable care..
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obvious reasons.2 A not-so obvious reason is underestimation by the
courts of expected loss from negligent conducts due to the courts' possible
lack of information on magnitude and probability of loss and the cost of
care. As a result, "due care" determined by the courts may fall below the
optimal care level. In this regard, an insurer will naturally have superior
information and will do better than the courts to determine and induce
optimal care against the expected loss. The detailed explanation of this
point will be made below in section A of the next part.
II. Why liability insurance may lead to better care
1. Insurers possess superior information on optimal care
The simple reason why insurers can motivate potentially liability parties to
take better care is that the insurers are likely to know better than the courts
when taking care is economically efficient because of the insurers' natural
informational advantage on the activities they insure. Information is the
key to the determination of optimal care. In order to determine optimal
care, three pieces of information are needed: the magnitude of a loss, its
probability, and the cost of care.23 Insurers' knowledge on all three pieces
of information is likely to be superior to that of the courts. In our previous
example, we knew that the cost of care ($100) was optimal because of
our information on the magnitude of loss ($1,000) and its probability both
before care (50%) and after care (30%). Misinformation on any of these
three aspects may affect the determination of optimal care and lead to
suboptimal care.
a. Information on the magnitude
Information on the magnitude of a loss may be easy to determine when
the number of victims is small and when the loss manifests itself within
a short period of time from negligent conduct. Yet on some occasions the
number of victims may be large and the loss may occur over a span of few
years. An example of this nature in the maritime context can be an incident
of oil spill from a tanker. The victims of a large scale oil spill may be many
22. Such reasons include a) inability of the victim to detect the negligent person, b) courts' error in
holding a negligent person not liable, c) victims' costs of litigation, which may not make it worthwhile
for them to pursue the litigation, and d) inability of a liable party to pay the liability judgment (or the
ability to shield assets against liability). Each possibility of escape makes the expected liability less
than the actual loss arising from negligence and lower expected liability may induce the potential
liable party not to expend on optimal care. See Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis, supra
note 6 at 217-18, 224-32, 275, 387-401; Shavell, Economic Analysis ofAccident Law, supra note 9 at
167-169.
23. See the "Hand Formula" mentioned supra note 18. See also Calabresi & Hirschoff, "Test for
Strict Liability," supra note 20 at 1056-57; Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis, supra note 6
at 188-89.
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and may suffer long term health problems, and financial consequences.
All the victims may not appear before the same court or/and at the same
time. As a result, it may be difficult for a particular court to determine
the actual magnitude of the loss and the court will likely underestimate it
because of the separate appearance of the claimants in different courts.24
Underestimation of the magnitude of loss will influence the determination
by the court of optimal care to prevent the loss. The court will determine
"due care" below its optimal level; and losses, which could have been
prevented by optimal care but not by the court-determined "due care,"
would continue to occur.
Optimal care is a relative term and depends on expected loss, 25 which
is arrived at by multiplying the magnitude and probability of a loss. Small
expected losses require little spending on precaution, while precaution
against potentially large losses may justify significant expenditure. In
contrast with the courts' information, a liability insurer will know the
actual magnitude of the insured's liability more accurately as the insurer
has to pay for the losses of all the victims whether they bring their claims
jointly or separately, simultaneously or consecutively. 26 With more accurate
information on the magnitude of the liability, an insurer would be in a
better position to determine the optimal care level against future liability.
b. Information on the probability of loss
As for the probability of a loss, it is more problematic to determine.
Negligent conduct such as high speed in a narrow sea-lane or defective
radar on a ship may result in a collision on one occasion and may cause no
harm on another. When a loss occurs and a plaintiff brings an action, the
court may consider the probability of a loss in terms of its foreseeability. If
24. Courts may sometimes overestimate the loss and set the due care level above optimal care.
Setting the due care level higher than optimal care may lead to excessive care. Although excessive care
amounts to social waste, courts' overestimation of possible loss will be very rare if we consider the
total social loss from negligence, and not just the loss of immediate victims. See the following note.
25. For analytical convenience, I limited the expected loss from negligent conduct to the pecuniary
and direct loss suffered by victims. For a thorough analysis, expected loss needs to include non-
pecuniary loss as well as the administrative costs of the liability system which would not have incurred
but for the negligent conducts. See Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis, supra note 6 at 269-
275, 284-85.
26. Negligent conduct with long term liability implications (e.g., negligent handling of toxic
substances) brings about uncertainty for insurers as to the actual liability payment over the years.
Insurers sometimes overcome such uncertainty by using "claim-made policy" instead of "occurrence
policy." In a claim-made policy, insurers are liable only for claims filed during the policy year as
opposed to claims made after the policy year for losses arising from negligent conduct in the policy
year. However, in a claim-made policy the insurer lacks motivation to determine total expected
liability from the negligent conduct and to devise optimal precautionary steps against such liability.
See Abraham, Distributing Risk, supra note 3 at 49-51.
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the loss is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the negligent conduct,27
liability will be imposed. Once liability is imposed, the courts do not
increase or reduce the liability based on actual probability of the loss. For
example, if the loss is $1,000, liability will be $1,000 regardless of whether
the probability of its occurrence from negligent conduct is 20 percent or
80 percent. This will not cause any distortion of incentives if the negligent
party has to account for the loss every time there is a loss arising from its
lack of care. In this way its, expected liability will equal the expected loss
and it will take care whenever the cost of care in preventing the loss is less
than the expected liability.28 However, for various reasons a negligent party
may escape liability despite the occurrence of a loss from its negligence.
29
As a result, its expected liability will be less than the expected loss caused
by its negligent conduct. For instance, if the negligent conduct gives rise to
two accidents with $1,000 loss on each occasion but the defendant is held
liable only on one occasion, its actual liability would be $1,000 despite the
actual loss from the negligence being $2,000. 30 In order to maintain proper
incentives, its liability has to be $2,000 when it is sued and held liable. Yet
the courts never impose liability more than the actual loss of the victims
except in cases of punitive or exemplary damages. Thus the imposition
of liability by courts will not reflect the actual probability of loss from
negligence.
Theoretically there is no reason for a liability insurer to charge a
prospective insured a premium higher than what would be the insured's
expected liability. If an insured escapes liability 50 percent time, its
insurance premium should also be 50 percent less than what it would be if
it were found liable in every incident of loss arising from its negligence.
However, in practice the premium is set ex-ante the actual losses, while
liability is imposed ex-post the actual losses. Consequently, a liability
insurer will rarely know the exact likelihood of courts' imposition of
liability on its insured. Also, it would be in the insurer's best interest if the
insured is never held liable. These two factors (insurer's uncertainty about
27. When a loss is not reasonably foreseeable, its probability may be very low so as not to justify the
cost of care, which includes the cost of obtaining information about the risk. See Posner, Economic
Analysis of Law, supra note 15 at 186-87. Even if prevention or reduction of such loss is cost-justified,
not holding parties liable for such loss may not have any detrimental effect on incentives to take care
because a potentially liable person would likely to overlook the possibility of such unforeseeable loss.
See Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis, supra note 6 at 238-39.
28. Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis, ibid. at 87-89, 236-37, 240.
29. See supra note 22.
30. Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis, supra note 6 at 244. Although a negligent party's
liability above the actual loss of the plaintiff in such a case will exceed the plaintiff's optimal
compensation, the additional liability may be imposed through fines, which would go to the state and
not to the plaintiff. Ibid. at 272-75.
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the insured's actual liability and the insurer's natural desire of never having
to pay for liability) combined would make the insurer want its insured to
take any precautionary step that was economically efficient.3' In order to
determine what precaution is economically efficient, the insurer's standard
would be expected loss, not simply the expected liability as determined
by allowing for the likelihood of escape. This level of care would also
exonerate a defendant insured from any liability for negligence and its
liability insurer would have nothing to indemnify unless there is error by
the court or the liability is strict.32
This simple analysis shows that the liability insurance would produce
better incentives in a potentially liable person than the liability law alone.
To summarize the point, in assessing liability courts fail to take into account
the actual probability of losses from negligent conduct and thus render the
expected liability lower than the expected loss. This will in turn affect the
determination of optimal care because, as mentioned earlier, optimal care
is a relative term and depends on the expected loss. Courts' determination
of "due care" would be less than optimal care and there would continue
to occur some losses which optimal care would have prevented.33 On the
other hand, an insurer would encourage its insureds to take optimal care
because the insurer's determination of such care would likely be based on
the expected loss as opposed to mere expected liability.
31. In the case of uncertainty about due care level or liability, a party may take more care than is
efficient in light of expected liability. An insured party may not do so due to the moral hazard problem.
However, there are insurance mechanisms, as discussed infra part 11.3, to check moral hazard. See
generally Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis, ibid. at 224-27.
32. These two factors may explain why a shipowner would be afraid of liability and consequently
would buy liability insurance, even when it takes every possible care or when no care is economically
cost-efficient. See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra note 15 at 171; Shavell, Foundations of
Economic Analysis, ibid. at 229-30. Theoretically, in the case of both negligence and strict liability
laws, an insurer could not motivate the insured to exercise more care than what is efficient. By
definition, any care above its efficient level would entail more cost than the benefit in reduction of loss
or liability. The insured would be financially better off not to exercise such high level of care even if it
is held liable for the loss, as would be the case under strict liability, and even if the premium increase
will follow to reflect the burden of strict liability. The increased expected liability and the resulting
premium increase would be less than the cost of care to eliminate such liability. However, in practice.
strict liability would likely lead the insured to take more care than what it would take under negligence
rule or even more than optimal care because the fear of uncertain future liability or premium increase
may weigh more in the minds of both the insurer and the insured than the inconvenience of additional
cost of care in the present. A different reason why strict liability may lead a potentially liable person
to more than efficient care exists when the plaintiff could prevent the same loss at a lesser cost, even
though the cost of care incurred by both the plaintiff and the defendant is less than the expected loss/
liability. See Shavell, Economic Analysis ofAccident Law, supra note 9 at 9-18.
33. See Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis, ibid. at 228-29.
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c. Information on the cost of care
As for the cost of care, again insurers are in a better position than the
courts to assess such cost. This is simply because insurers have the
expertise and technical knowledge on the subject matter they insure. They
would usually have superior knowledge than the courts on how much it
would cost, for instance, to employ an additional crew member or to fit a
ship with the latest fire-fighting technology.34 With the better knowledge
on the cost of care, the magnitude and the probability of a loss, insurers
can analyse whether a precautionary measure is cost-efficient or not. A
measure is efficient if and only if the cost of care is less than the expected
loss.35 Failure to take care in such case amounts to negligence.36 Once an
insurer determines what precautions are optimal, it can then use various
insurance mechanisms such as rate variance, policy exception, policy
limit, deductible, etc. to ensure that the actual care taken by the insured
corresponds to optimal care.
2. Various legal principles strengthen insurers 'informational
advantage
In addition to their natural informational advantage, insurers can obtain
any special or peculiar information about the insured subject matter or
about the individual insured with the aid of various legal principles. The
more an insurer knows about the idiosyncratic features of the insured ship
and the personality of the individual insured, the better the insurer can
determine the probability and magnitude of losses and consequently the
cost of optimal care. Two principles of insurance law can be very effective
in this regard: the duty of disclosure and insurance warranty.
34. As most insurance disputes in fact arise between insurers (e.g., a liability insurer defending a
liability claim against its insured shipowner) and/or insurance-like entities such as the Ship-Source
Oil Pollution Fund (SSOPF) or the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund (IOPCF) trying to
recoup the compensation they have paid to the victims of oil pollution, courts incidentally benefit from
the expertise and experience of these insurers and insurance-like institutions. It is true that the presence
and assistance of these experts will reduce the courts' information disadvantage as compared to that of
insurers, thus helping the courts to determine the expected loss and optimal care level more accurately.
In addition, judges dealing with marine insurance matters are more likely than not to be among the
judges experienced in maritime matters. Still the insurer of a particular ship is likely to know better
about the specific care aspects of the insured ship than the experts, who may also be insurers but not
the insurers of the same ship under the proceedings, and the judges, who may be very knowledgeable
about marine insurance matters but are not likely to be more aware than the ship's insurer about its
special features.
35. To be exact, this would be the case when taking proper precautions will completely eliminate the
loss. If taking precautions only reduces the magnitude or probability of the loss, then cost is optimal if
it is less than the difference between the expected loss before and after taking the precautions.
36. See the "Hand Formula," supra note 18.
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a. Duty to disclose material facts
An insured is required to disclose before the formation of an insurance
contract any material circumstance which would influence the insurer's
decision either in taking the risk or in fixing the amount of premium.37 The
consequence of the breach of this duty is the avoidance of an insurance
contract regardless of any causal connection between the breach and a
subsequent loss.38 This duty is based on the notion that marine insurance is
a contract of utmost good faith (uberrimaefidei). As a result, a prospective
insurer is required not only to avoid misinforming any fact requested by
the insurer, as is the case under the general law of contract (i.e., the law of
misrepresentation), but also to disclose voluntarily any relevant material
circumstances the insured knows or ought to know.39 The rationale behind
this requirement lies in the fact that a prospective insured will usually
have better information on any special or unusual facts about the insured
subject matter.4 °
37. See Marine Insurance Act, S.C. 1993, c.22, s. 21(1) [MIA]; Marine Insurance Act, 1906 (U.K.), 6
Edw VII, c. 41, s. 18(l) [UK-MIA]. See also the House of Lords' decision on the meaning of"material
fact" and "inducement" in Pan Atlantic Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pine Top Insurance Co. Ltd., [1994]
3 All E.R. 581, 2 Ll. L. Rep. 427 (H.L.), where the court applied an objective test to determine
"materiality" but a subjective test to decide "inducement." The decision partially overruled the English
Court of Appeal's decision in Container Transport International Inc. v. Oceanus Mutual Underwriting
Association, [1984] I Ll. L.R. 476, 1984 WL 281688 (C.A.), where an objective test was applied for
both "materiality" and "inducement." In Canada the Ontario case Nuvo Electronics Inc. v. London
Assurance (2000), 49 O.R. (3d) 374, 19 C.C.LI. (3d) 195 (S.C.J.) discussed the above House of Lords
decision but did not follow the House of Lords' definition of "materiality."
38. Henwood v. Prudential Insurance Company ofAmerica, [1967] S.C.R. 720, 64 D.L,R. (2d) 715
(where the insured died in an automobile accident and the policy was avoided because of the insured's
failure to disclose the fact that he was suffering from clinical depression).
39. MIA, supra note 37 at s. 20; UK-MIA, supra note 37 at s. 17. See Carter v. Boehm, (1766) 3
Burr. 1905 at 1909, 97 E.R. 1162 [Carter, cited to Burr.]. Here, Lord Mansfield states, "Good faith
forbids either party, by concealing what he privately knows, to draw the other party into the bargain
owing to his ignorance of that fact, and believing the contrary.'" As for the connection between the duty
of disclosure (MIA, supra note 37 at s. 2 1(1)); UK-MIA, supra note 37 at s. 18(1)) and the doctrine
of utmost good faith (MIA, ibid. at s. 20; UK-MIA, ibid. at s. 17), see Howard Bennett, The Law of
Marine Insurance, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) at 102-103, 158 [Bennett, The Law
of Marine Insurance]; see also Coronation Insurance Co. v. Taku Air Transport Ltd., [1991] 3 S.C.R.
622, [1992] 1 W.W.R. 217 at 228. The doctrine of utmost good faith may, of course, apply to all stages
of an insurance contract and is much broader than the duty of disclosure, which is relevant mainly at
the contract pre-formation stage. However, as the sole statutory remedy of the breach of good faith in
the form of contract avoidance may cause severe hardship for the insured, especially when the breach
is discovered only after the occurrence of an insured peril, courts tend to limit the application of the
doctrine only to the contract pre-formation stage. Ibid. at 175-180.
40. Carter, ibid. at 1909. Here, Lord Mansfield states, "Insurance is a contract upon speculation.
The special facts, upon which the contingent chance is to be computed, lie most commonly in the
knowledge of the insured only: the underwriter trusts to his representation, and proceeds upon
confidence that he does not keep back any circumstance in his knowledge, to mislead the underwriter
into a belief that the circumstance does not exist, and to induce him to estimate the risque, as if it did
not exist." See also Bennett, The Law of Marine Insurance, ibid. at 100-108.
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This legal requirement and the severe consequences flowing from its
breach help an insurer to know the strengths and weaknesses of a particular
insured ship. This information in turn facilitates the determination of the
expected loss from the particular ship. The key to the inducement of optimal
care is the ability of an insurer to set the premium reflecting as closely as
possible the amount of expected loss from each individual insured.41 If a
premium is set at a rate less than the expected loss, an insured may over-
invest in insurance and under-invest in loss prevention.42 If it is higher
than expected loss, the opposite may occur, i.e., prospective insureds will
over-invest in risk prevention and under-invest in insurance. 43 Neither is
efficient. The first situation is inefficient because it will perpetuate the
problem of moral hazard as it would be cheaper to insure than to take
preventive measures. The second situation is undesirable for it causes a
risk-averse individual to take excessive precaution, i.e., the cost of care is
more than the expected loss.44
The cost of information or lack of it is the main obstacle to set the
premium rate to mirror the expected loss or liability of each individual
insured.45 Duty to disclose material facts not only facilitates the obtaining
of necessary information but also reduces the cost of information by
requiring an insured to disclose those facts which are likely to be within
the insured's knowledge or which the insured could obtain at a cheaper
cost. This also makes economic sense. On the other hand, when the insurer
could obtain some information more easily or with lesser cost, there is no
justification in imposing on the insured this duty of disclosure for such
information and the law rightly and roughly limits the duty at that point.46
41. For example, suppose the expected loss before any care is $2,000, out of which $1,000 cannot
be eliminated by optimal care either because it is purely accidental or because taking care is not cost-
efficient. If the other $1,000 can be eliminated by taking care at $500, setting the premium at $2,000
for an insured who does not spend $500 on care to reflect its expected loss, and reducing the premium
to $1,000 for another insured who spends $500 on care to reflect the latter's expected loss would lead
the former to take care at a cost of $500. For the connection between expected loss and premium, see
Abraham, Distributing Risk, supra note 3 at 2.
42. Ibid. at 15. For instance, if insurance premium in the above note is set at $1,200 regardless of
care, the first insured would not invest $500 on -- re and the second insured would pay $1,200 in
premiums instead of $ 1,000 and would spend noazv:._ on care.
43. I.e., the premium in the above example in note 41 is set at more than $2,000.
44. The very purpose of insurance is to reduce the problem of risk aversion so that risk-averse people
do not take excessive caution (i.e., over-invest in risk-prevention). If insurance itself is the source risk
aversion, it fails in its purpose. For the definition and effect of risk aversion see part ll.4.a, infra.
45. See generally Abraham, Distributing Risk, supra note 3 at 67-69.
46. See MIA, supra note 37 at ss. 21(5)(b)-(c); Canadian Indemnity Co. v Canadian Johns-Mansville
Co., [ 1990] 2 S.C.R. 549, 72 D.L.R. (4th) 478; Coronation Insurance Co. v. Taku Air Transport Ltd,
[199113 S.C.R. 622, [1992] I W.W.R. 217.
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Material facts with regard to insurance of a ship include its loss history47
age,48 flag,49 value,50 required certification,5' criminal allegations against its
owners or crew,52 any unusual structural feature, etc. All this information
gives an insurer a better idea about the seaworthiness of the insured ship
or the expected loss from its operation as well as about the standard of
care by the shipowner and crew or their tendency of moral hazard. The
insurer can then use various insurance mechanisms to make sure that the
insured improves its care level. The insurer can also recommend structural
changes on the insured ship based on the acquired information.
b. Insurance Warranties
Proper assessment of risk or expected loss may require that an insurer
have more information than those falling under the legal test of "material
circumstance,"the disclosure of which is already required by law. Some
other information, though not material under the legal test of "materiality,"
may help an insurer to assess further about the expected loss or liability
of a particular ship. For example, information on the number of crew
members or fire-fighting system onboard may be useful in determining
the likelihood of losses due to these factors. In order to ensure all the
information sought and obtained is true, the insurer may include in the
insurance application that every fact stated there is warranted to be true to
the best of the applicant's knowledge whether material or not. 3
Besides the truth of an existing fact, a warranty can also be used
for a future fact, i.e., for making sure that an insured takes the desired
precautionary steps in the future. 4 The position of a warranty in insurance
47. Neepawa Yacht Ltd. v. Laurentian P & C Insurance Co. (1994), [1995] B.C.W.L.D. 931, 1994
CarswellBC 3080 (S.C.); Laurentian Pacific Insurance Co. v. Halama (1991), 7 C.C.L.I. (2d) 84, 60
B.C.L.R. (2d) 190 (S.C.).
48. Nova Scotia Marine Insurance Co. v. Stevenson (1894), 23 S.C.R. 137, rev'g. (1893), 25 N.S.R.
210 (C.A.).
49. See Seaman v. West (18'85), Cout. Cas. 723, Cassels S.C. 388 (S.C.C.), aff'g (1884), 17 N.S.R.
207 (C.A.).
50. Fudge v. Charter Marine Insurance Co (1992),8 C.C.LI. (2d) 252,97 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 91 (Nfld.
S.C.T.D.).
51. Atlantic Freighting Co. v. Provincial Insurance Co. Ltd. (1956), 5 D.L.R. (2d) 164 (N.S.S.C.).
52. North Star Shipping Ltd. v. Sphere Drake Insurance Plc, [2006] 2 All ER (Comm) 65, [2006] 2
Lloyd's Rep 183 (C.A.).
53. See, for example, the "basis clause" in rule 6(2) of the Britannia P&I rules; cited in Bennett, The
Law of Marine Insurance, supra note 39 at 181.
54. MIA, supra note 37 at s. 32(l)(a)-(b). For example, in Shearwater Marine Ltd. v. Guardian
Insurance Co of Canada (1998), 60 B.C.L.R. (3d) 37 (C.A.), aff'g. (1997), 29 B.C.L.R. (3d) 13 (S.C.),
the insurance contract contained a warranty in the following wordings, "Warranted ... Vessel inspected
daily basis and pumped as necessary." See also DeGroot v. J.T O'Bryan & Co (1979), 15 B.C.L.R.
271 at 281 (C.A.) as to the need of(promissory) warranty for certainty in future facts/obligations. See
also George R. Strathy & George C. Moore, The Law and Practice of Marine Insurance in Canada
(Markham: Butterworths, 2003) at 43 and 72-73 [Strathy & Moore, Marine Insurance in Canada].
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law is similar to that of a condition precedent in general contract law55;
breach of a warranty discharges an insurer from any prospective obligation
for insured loss or liability. Since the refusal of coverage following the
breach of warranty does not require any causal connection between the
breach and the subsequent lOSS,56 the warranty makes an insured act in
respect to the warranted precautionary steps as if it had no insurance.
It is noteworthy that although insurers may gather most of the relevant
information from the insured by virtue of the legal duty to disclose
material facts and through various insurance warranties, no insurer bases
its risk assessment entirely on the information provided by the prospective
insured. Insurers will invariably use their own surveyors and rely on the
survey reports prepared by the ship's classification society to further
inform themselves in order to assess the risk more accurately.
3. Various insurance mechanisms create stronger financial incentives
For the purpose of loss reduction, it is not enough for insurers to have
better information on expected liability and optimal care. Ultimately, it
is the insureds who have to take the actual care. Thus, there is a need to
devise some ways to motivate potentially liable insureds to take optimal
care. Both the courts, through liability law, and the insurers through various
insurance mechanisms, try to address this need. It will be shown in this
section that through the financial incentives of the insurance mechanisms
insurers can address this need better than the courts can with the liability
law alone. The insurance mechanisms mainly revolve around premium
rates and coverage restrictions. With the threat of premium increase and
coverage reduction and/or exclusion, they deter an insured from negligence
and carelessness. Although some mechanisms on their separate analysis
55. See Elkhorn Development Ltd. v. Sovereign General Insurance Co. (2001), 87 B.C.L.R. (3d) 290,
26 C.C.L.I. (3d) 23 (C.A.), rev'g (2000), 18 C.C.L.I. (3d) 203, (B.C.S.C.).
56. MIA, supra note 37 at s. 39(l)-(2). See also Beacon Life & Fire Assurance Co. v. Gibb (1862),
1 Moo. P.C.N.S. 73 (P.C.). Because of this harsh consequence, courts in Canada are very reluctant to
find breach of warranty unless both its wording and the breach are clear and unambiguous. See Strathy
& Moore, Marine Insurance in Canada, supra note 54 at 132, 143-44. Courts have made a distinction
between "warranty" and "suspensive condition" or "warranty delimiting the risk," Breach of the latter
only suspends the coverage and a loss not causally connected to the breach is recoverable from the
insurer. See Century Insurance Co. of Canada v. Case Existological L aboratories Lid, [ 1983] 2 S.C.R.
47, 150 D.L.R. (3d), 2 C.C.LI. 172, aff'g. (1982), 35 B.C.L.R. 364, 133 D.L.R. (3d) 727 (C.A.), rev'g.
(1980), 116 D.L.R. (3d) 199 (B.C.S.C.); Tulloch v. Canada (Department of Fisheries and Oceans)
(1988), 21 F.T.R. 72, 32 C.C.L.I. 36, aff'd. (1989), 96 N.R. 51, 37 C.C.LI. 229 (F.C.A.); Landmark
Corp. v. Northumberland General Insurance Co. (1984), 8 C.C.L.I. 118 (Ont. H.C.J.); Federal Business
Development Bank v. Commonwealth Insurance Co. (1983), 2 C.C.L.I. 200 (B.C.S.C.). However, in
order to avoid the uncertainty of courts' interpretation some insurers not only describe a condition as
a warranty but also expressly mention forfeiture of the policy as the consequence of its breach. See
clause I of the British Columbia Builders' Risks Clauses (1/1/89); cited in Strathy & Moore, Marine
Insurance in Canada, ibid. at 137 note 4.
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may appear less effective than the liability law in creating incentives, their
joint use will generate stronger incentives than the use of liability law
alone.
a. Premium rate-variance
As the imposition of liability can no longer directly deter a potentially
liable party from negligence when it has insurance, the issue of incentives
totally depends on various insurance mechanisms. 7 Premium rate
variance on the basis of an insured's actual care and loss experience58
is the most important insurance mechanism to induce optimal care. 9
Premium rate variance fills the vacuum in terms of incentives left by the
availability of liability insurance.60 By rewarding precautionary measures
through premium reduction and by penalizing negligent practices through
premium increase, 6' insurers play the role of the courts in creating
incentives towards care.
More importantly, for our purpose, rate variance may create stronger
financial motivation for an insured to take precautions for the following
reasons. First, imposition of liability has financial implications only in
the case at issue, while premium increase following a liability may have
financial consequences for a long period to come. 62 Second, as the premium
rate depends on actual precautionary steps before an incidence of a loss/
liability, financial reward for such steps is more immediate and certain in
premium reduction than in the possibility of not being held liable. A dollar
in the pocket has more value than a dollar in future expectation.
57. Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis, supra note 6 at 257, 265-66.
58. While incentives through rate variance based on actual care (feature rating) depend on the
insurer's ability to observe various aspects of care taken by the insured, such ability is not necessary to
induce care in the case of rate variance on the basis loss history (experience rating). Experience rating,
however, takes place after the occurrence of losses and may sometimes take years to be reflected in
actual premiums, especially in maritime insurance. In other words, the shortcomings of one factor may
be compensated for by the advantages of the other. See generally Abraham, Distributing Risk, supra
note 3 at 71-73. See also Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis, ibid. at 262-63, 277 at n. 7.
59. Abraham, Distributing Risk, ibid. at 15.
60. As Prof. Atiyah puts it, "although the tortfeasor will not personally have to pay any damages
awarded against him, his insurer will have to do so; and the insurer may visit his displeasure on
the insured by increasing. his insurance premiums." P.S. Atiyah, "Accident Prevention and Variable
Premium Rates for Work-Connected Accidents" (1975) 4 Indus. L.J. I at I [emphasis added].
61. See the example given supra note 41.
62. See Edgar Gold, "Marine Pollution Liability After 'Exxon Valdez': The U.S. 'All-Or-Nothing
Lottery! .' (1991) 22 J. Mar. L. & Com. 423 at 429: "Although it is sometimes suggested that this fairly
extensive [marine] insurance coverage might contribute to a careless operational attitude, this is an
erroneous view. Insurance rates are not calculated only on actuarial projections, but are also related to
the loss record of a particular owner and/or vessel. Accordingly, even if the accident is fully covered
by liability insurance today, the shipowner will be paying increased premiums tomorrow."
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In the context ofmarine insurance, premium rate widely varies from ship
to ship based on their physical structure and strength (seaworthiness) and
their loss history. For example, in 1969 the premium for individual tanker
owners varied from 3 cents to 150 cents per gross ton in the Norwegian
Protection and Indemnity (P&I) club, SKULD.63 It is noteworthy here that
shipowners' mutual P& I clubs are the usual providers of marine liability
insurance. 6 Both liability and hull insurers roughly assess the seaworthiness
of a vessel from the reports of various surveys conducted by the insurers'
own surveyors and those appointed by the vessel's classification society.65
Maintaining the class and the membership in the same classification society
are conditions precedent to the continuance of insurance coverage in both
hull and liability insurance.66 Even in open or floating cargo insurance,
there is usually a "classification clause"6 7 requiring the insured shipper
to ship its goods on vessels of specified class and age. 68 As for the loss
history, P&I clubs and hull insurers generally require the disclosure of
claim records at least for the previous five years. 69 Unusual loss history-
even beyond the time period specified by the insurers-if not very remote,
may amount to a material fact and its disclosure by the insured would be
mandated under the legal duty to disclose material facts.7 °
Combined with their superior knowledge on expected loss and optimal
care, the insurers' ability to hold carrot and stick through rate variance
based on vessels' seaworthiness and loss history alone would suffice to
63. LEG/CONF.2/C.I/WP. 3 (30 Nov. 1971) in Official Records of the Conference on the
Establishment of an International Compensation Fund for Oil Pollution Damage 1971 (IMCO,
London: 1978) at 242.
64. Over 90 percent of the world's ocean-going tonnage is insured by the International Group of
P&I clubs: Bennett, The Law of Marine Insurance, supra note 39 at 486; Mark Tilley, "The Origin and
Development of the Mutual Shipowners' Protection & Indemnity Associations" (1986) 17 J. Mar. L &
Com. 261. See also the Group's website at <http://www.igpandi.org> (last visited: August 6, 2007).
65. Historically, vessels were classed with different gradations based on an assessment of various
factors, mainly bearing on the vessels' seaworthiness. Classification societies do not use such gradation
today; a vessel is now either "in class" or not. Yet the initial and the periodic survey reports provide
valuable information to vessels' insurers. See B.D. Daniel, "Potential Liability of Marine Classification
Societies to Non-Contracting Parties" (2007) 19 U.S.F. Mar. L. J. 183 at 189.
66. Stephen Martin, "Marine Protection and Indemnity Insurance: Conduct, Intent, and Punitive
Damages" (2003) 28 Tul. Mar. L.J. 45 at 48-49 [Martin, Marine Protection].
67. Institute Classification Clause 13/4/92; see Strathy & Moore, Marine Insurance in Canada,
supra note 54 at 23 and 150. This clause indirectly leads a shipowner to better maintenance of its ship
in order to attract business from cargo owners.
68. These clauses in insurance policies show the reliance marine insurers place on risk assessements
by classification societies.
69. See Laurentian Pacific Insurance Co. v. Halama (1991), 7 C.C.L.I. (2d) 84, 60 B.C.L.R. (2d)
190 (S.C.); see also S. J. Hazelwood, P & L Clubs: Law and Practice, 3d ed. (London: LLP, 2000) at
115-16 [Hazelwood, P. & I. Clubs].
70. See New Hampshire Insurance Co v. Oil Refineries Lid, [2002] 2 Lloyd's Rep 462; [2003]
Lloyd's Rep IR 386 (C.A.).
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put them in a better position than the courts to induce potentially liable
shipowners to exercise due diligence. Yet an insurer would use additional
mechanisms' besides rate variance to maintain care. As mentioned earlier,
some of these mechanisms may not on their separate application induce
better care than the liability law alone. However, their joint use with rate
variance would create incremental incentives for the insured to use care.
Following are some of those mechanisms.
b. Deductibles
The ideal situation for maintaining proper incentives in the mind of an
insured can be imagined if the insured could be made to act as if it were
a "prudent uninsured," a phrase used in most of the P&I club rules.7 An
actual prudent uninsured would take reasonable care in every dimension
whether courts can observe its care or not, if it has to directly pay for
the liability of any loss arising from its activity regardless of the actual
care."- This situation can only exist if the liability is strict and there is
no liability insurance. However, imposition of strict liability and absence
of liability insurance will have their own problems correspondingly in
reducing incentives for victims to take care73 and in discouraging people
from investing in socially desirable activities 4; discussion of these
problems is beyond the scope of this paper. Yet with the availability of
liability insurance in the context of negligence-based liability,75 what
an insurer can do to make the insured to act as a "prudent uninsured" is
to reduce the coverage by various insurance mechanisms or to exclude
it altogether in specific cases. Deductible is one of these mechanisms.
Others include policy ceiling, franchise clause, uninsured warranty, and
policy exceptions for certain risks where moral hazard is exceptionally
71. For example, see Rule 23 B(i) in Martin, Marine Protection, supra note 66 at 50.
72. See Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis, supra note 6 at 98-99 and 189.
73. This would only occur in bilateral care situations, i.e., where both the injurer and the victim can
take care at the same time. See supra note 9. See also Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis,
ibid. at 184-88.
74. See Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis, ibid. at 259-61.
75. As the reduction of incentives in negligence-based liability law is due mainly to the possible
inability of the courts to observe or verify some aspects of care, the presence of insurance may improve
the situation to the extent that insurers can observe or identify better than the courts those not-easily
verifiable aspects of care. Although strict liability obviates the need for the courts to verify the actual
care taken by a defendant, the presence of insurance in strict liability situation may bring back the
problem of verification for the insurers when even the insurers cannot observe some aspects of care.
However, as higher insurance payouts for strict liability will ultimately be reflected in premium rates,
reduction of incentives due to the presence of insurance in strict liability situation may be minimal. As
insurers will address the problem of moral hazard by adjusting premium rates regardless of liability
rules, the analysis in this paper is equally applicable to both negligence and strict liability situations.
See generally Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis, ibid. at 217-18.
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serious. When insurance policies contain deductibles, the insureds remain
uninsured for the amount of the deductibles. In maritime context, both
P&I and hull insurance usually include deductible clauses and the amount
of deductibles may vary from one loss or liability to another within the
same policy.
7 6
As the insureds have to directly bear any liability up to the deductible
amount, they would have financial incentives to take care to prevent a
liability-causing incident. However, the incentive effect of deductible
would be diluted when liability is likely to exceed the amount of
deductible by a large margin. A highly probable risk of large liability will
justify strong precautionary steps to prevent or reduce the risk. Yet the
cost of such precaution may exceed an insured's expected deductible.
Other things being equal, an insured as a rational individual would not
spend more than its expected deductible. Here, the effect of insurance
payout above deductible on the incentives to take care is similar to that
of limitation of liability principle, i.e., both reduce the expected liability
amount and consequently the defendant's care level.7" For example, with
a 10 percent probability of $1,000 liability the expected liability is $100.
If the deductible is $500, its expected value is only $50. A rational insured
would not spend on care more than $50, while spending any amount up to
$100 on care would be economically efficient.
As an insured bears the financial burden of deductible only when it
incurs liability and only for a fraction of liability, the incentive effect of
deductible cannot be either equal to or more than that of liability. The only
exception would be when the cost of optimal care is below the expected
deductible, i.e., $50 in our example.78 However, even though the presence
of deductible alone may not induce better care than the liability law,
combined with rate variance and other insurance mechanisms deductible
would lead to better incentives than the liability law alone. In other words,
the shortcoming of deductibles in terms of incentives will be compensated
76. See International Hull Clauses (01/11/03), clause 15; Institute Time Clauses Hulls (1/10/83
and 1/11/95), cl 12; Hazelwood, P & L Clubs, supra note 69 at 259-260. Statistics on 119 major
cargo claims paid by Gard, a Norwegian P&I club, show that there was about US$3.4 million in
deductibles out of total US$60 million payouts. The study period was five years from 1996 to 2000.
See Claims Statistics (Gard AS, 2005) at 4, online: <http://www.gard.no/iknowbase/Contentl1 1991/
Claims%20Statistics low.pdf> [Gards Claims Statistics].
77. For the effect of limitation of liability on incentives of liability law, see Muhammad M. Billah,
"Economic Analysis of Limitation of Shipowners' Liability" (2007) 19 U.S.F. Mar. L. J. 297.
78. i.e., if $50 is what it takes to completely eliminate the risk or reduce it to an economically
efficient level, then the deductible will induce optimal care. See generally Shavell, Economic Analysis
ofAccident Law, supra note 9 at 194-96.
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for by the other insurance mechanisms. Liability ceiling is certainly one
of those mechanisms.
c. Liability ceiling or upward limit
While deductible is a very useful tool in inducing care when the magnitude
of liability is low, liability ceiling is a more effective means to achieve
optimal care when the amount of liability is likely to be very high. Again,
as an insured will bear the direct financial burden of liability above the
ceiling, the higher the liability the greater would be the exposure to such
financial burden and, consequently, the stronger the incentives to prevent
or reduce the liability. In addition to maintain incentives, an insurer may
impose a liability ceiling in order to limit its maximum exposure and to
buy reinsurance against such exposure.
In the context of marine insurance, liability ceiling accompanied one
of the earliest areas of liability insurance, that is, insurance for collision
liability. Coverage for collision liability was and is still largely provided
by hull insurers under a separate clause in the insurance policy, known
as "Running-Down Clause."Before the introduction of this clause, the
provision of insurance was mainly confined to property insurance in the
form of coverage for accidental losses in ships and cargoes.79 As this was
among the first areas of liability insurance, insurers were understandably
concerned with the effect of such insurance on an insured's incentives to
care. In fact, this concern led the Lloyds' underwriters to petition, though
unsuccessfully, to the British Board of Trade in 1854 to ban collision
liability insurance." Eventually, however, their concern translated into
the imposition of a maximum limit on the coverage to three-fourths of the
total liability." This clause survives even today in modem hull clauses.82
An interesting contrast here is the liability insurance coverage provided
79. See Coronation Insurance Co. v. Taku Air Transport Ltd, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 622, [1992] 1 W.W.R.
217, per Justice Cory at 229, "When Lord Mansfield set the principle governing insurance contracts
the world was a little different. It was a simpler if not, in some respects, a gentler place. The business
of insurahce was very different. The policies of insurance were issued most frequently to cover a vessel
or its cargo. The contract was issued for the benefit of the insured." [emphasis added]
80. William R.A. Birch Reynardson, "The History and Development of P&I Insurance: the British
Scene" (1969) 43 Tul. L. Rev. 457 at 467.
81. The three-fourths of collision liability is actually in proportion to the insured value of the vessel.
So, if the actual collision liability is more than the insured value of the vessel, the three-fourths of
the actual liability would also exceed three-fourths collision liability coverage. However, the insured
can buy supplementary cover for this excess under Institute Time Clauses-Hulls Excess Liabilities
(1/11/95). See Bennett, The Law of Marine Insurance, supra note 39 at 400-401, n. 48.
82. See clause 6.1 of the International Hull Clauses (01/11/03). Similar restriction on hull insurance
with regard to the value of the ship was legally imposed by the first codification of marine insurance
laws in Barcelona in 1435: F. Martin, ThefHistory ofLloyds and of Marine Insurance in Great Britain,
(New York: Burt Franklin, 1876) at 25.
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by the International Group of P&I clubs. The Group's coverage is virtually
unlimited. Under an "overspill" po oling agreement and through four layers
of reinsurance, the Group currently provides coverage up to $5.4 billion
per liability incident.83
Although a policy limit would induce care, where liability is likely to
exceed the ceiling, an insured's care level may still be less than optimal
simply because its personal exposure to liability would be lower than the
total amount of liability. The incentive effect of insurance ceiling suffers
from the same shortcoming as that of deductible and limitation of liability
principle. If there is a 10 percent chance of $ 100,000 liability, the expected
liability would be $10,000. If the insurance ceiling is $70,000, the insured
will personally shoulder the burden of $30,000 out of $100,000 liability
and the expected value of this burden is only $3,000. In order to prevent
the liability-causing incident, the insured may be willing to spend only
up to $3,000. Yet optimal care may cost any amount up to $10,000, the
amount representing the expected liability as opposed to the expected
personal exposure from the liability ceiling.
For similar reasons as those in the case of deductible, a liability ceiling
alone cannot logically create stronger incentives than liability law would
do in the absence of insurance. However, if the cost of optimal care is
less than the insured's expected personal exposure from liability ceiling
alone or from the combined amount of liability ceiling and deductible,
the insured would take such care. Another interesting point here is that
an insured is certainly a risk-averse party.84 A risk-averse party would be
willing rather to spend more than an amount equivalent to its expected
personal exposure than to bear the actual financial burden of deductible
and liability ceiling.85 In addition, the presence of liability ceiling does not
mean that the underwriter is going to forgo their most effective tool, i.e.,
the rate variance.
d. Franchise clause
Some marine insurance policies may contain a franchise clause instead
of a deductible clause. As in the case of deductibles, an insured remains
personally responsible for any liability falling below the limit in the
franchise clause. The insured thus has adequate incentives to prevent any
incident which might give rise to liability below the franchise limit. As the
83. International Group of P&I Clubs, The Pooling Agreement, online: <http://www.igpandi.org/
internal.php?primary-nav-selected=The+Group+Agreements&secondary=The+Pooling+Agreement
> (last visited Apr. I1, 2007).
84. For the definition and effect of "risk-aversion" see ll.4.a infra.
85. This is not excessive care as long as the cost does not exceed the total expected loss/liability, even
though it is more than expected uninsured liability arising from deductible and franchise clauses.
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effect of a franchise clause in this regard is similar to that of deductible,
earlier comments on the comparison between deductible and liability law
equally apply here. However, a franchise clause differs from a deductible
clause when the liability exceeds the franchise limit; in such a case, insurers
pay for the total amount of liability, including the amount falling below the
limit in the franchise clause. Consequently, if potential liability is likely to
exceed the franchise limit, an insured would have little incentive to prevent
or reduce such liability because the insurer would have to pay not only the
amount exceeding the franchise limit but also the amount falling belov
it. This feature of franchise clauses may even encourage the insured to
intentionally inflate a loss so that liability for the loss exceeds the franchise
limit and the entire burden falls on the insurer. Although this is a serious
shortcoming of a franchise clause in terms of incentives to care, franchise
clauses are not designed to maintain incentives. Rather their main purpose
is administrative cost-saving in avoiding insurance payment for smaller
claims falling below a certain threshold. 6 As an insurer is likely to use other
insurance mechanisms alongside a franchise clause to address the problem
of moral hazard, the administrative cost-saving from the franchise limit
may outweigh its shortcoming in terms of incentives. In modem marine
insurance, franchise clauses generally appear in the freight insurance and
the amount is usually a percentage of the total freight insured. 7 Modem
franchise clauses are the successors of "particular average" warranty (i.e.,
exclusion of partial loss) in old insurance policies.88
e. Uninsured. warranty
While the above insurance mechanisms leave an insured not covered for
a certain amount either below a threshold or above a ceiling, they do not
forbid the insured from buying coverage elsewhere for the uncovered
portion.89 With regard to this portion, an insured has a choice either to
obtain market insurance or remain self-insured. Purchase of coverage for.
86. See Bennett, The Law of Marine Insurance, supra note 39 at 744-45. Although the deductible
clause also has a similar advantage in reducing the administrative cost for small claims, it cannot
.be said that the saving of administrative cost is its main function because, if otherwise, there is no
justification for deducting any amount when the loss or liability exceeds the deductible limit; the main
function of the deductible must be the maintenance of some incentives to take care.
87. See Institute Time Clauses Freight (1/8/89 and 1/11/95), cl 12; Institute Voyage Clauses Freight
(1/8/89 and 1/11/95), cl 10.
88. The word "warranty" here means "exclusion." For discussion and examples of particular average
warranty, see Grant Gilmore & Charles L. Black Jr., The Law of Admiralty, 2d ed. (Mineola, NY:
Foundation Press Inc., 1975) at 79-82 [Gilmore & Black].
89. For example, see clause 6. 1 of the International Hull Clauses (01/11/03), providing three-fourths
coverage for collision liability without any prohibition on obtaining coverage for the remaining one-
fourth. In fact, optional clause 38 of the Intemational Hull Clauses or P&I liability insurance.provides
coverage for this portion. See Bennett, The Law of Marine Insurance, supra'note 39 at 398-99.
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the uncovered portion from other insurers distorts the incentive effects of
the above mechanisms. If the distortion is serious, insurers may include
an uninsured warranty in the policy. Under an uninsured warranty, the
insured is prohibited from buying coverage for certain risk or above a
certain limit.9" As mentioned earlier, an insurance warranty has the effect
of a condition precedent in contract law and its breach renders the policy
voidable. Any loss or liability following the breach does not fall on the
insurer regardless of any causal connection between the breach and the
loss or liability.
There were instances in marine insurance where a liability insurer not
only left a certain portion of the riskuncovered but required the insured to
retain that portion of the risk uninsured.9 Although uninsured warranty is
rare in modem policies, 92 there are still some restrictions on the maximum
amount of coverage an insured can buy from the market for certain
disbursements, managers' commissions, and for some types of freight.93
The comparative analysis of uninsured warranty with liability law in
terms of incentives is similar to that of deductible, franchise limit, and
liability ceiling. If the expected exposure to direct financial burden due
to uninsured warranty is more than the cost of optimal care, the insured
would have adequate incentives to take such care. If it is less, as will
usually be the case, the incentive effect may suffer to the extent of the
difference between optimal cost of care and expected personal burden of
liability under uninsured warranty. In other words, the incentive effect
of uninsured warranty is not additional to that of the above insurance
mechanisms because an uninsured warranty does not directly reduce an
insured's insurance coverage; it only ensures that underinsurance through
deductible or policy limit is maintained so as to retain the incentive effects
from those coverage restrictions.
90. See generally Bennett, The Law of Marine Insurance, ibid. at 545-48.
91. See Muirhead v. Forth & North Sea Steamboat Mutual Insurance Association, [1894] AC 72;
cited ibid. A similar purpose can be achieved also through "no other insurance" warranty; see Butler v
Merchants Marine Insurance Co. (1885), Cass. Dig. 390 (S.C.C.).
92. Even though hull insurers may limit coverage to three-fourths for collision liability, they do not
forbid the purchase of coverage for the remaining one-forth from other insurers. In fact, the insured
usually buys coverage for this remaining portion either from the same hull insurer or from a P&I club.
Bennett, The Law of Marine Insurance, ibid. at 400-401. As for other kinds of liability insurance,
coverage is practically unlimited. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
93. See Institute Time Clauses Hulls (1/10/83), cl 21.2; (1/11/95), c1 22.2; International Hull Clauses
(01/11/03), cl 24.2; Institute Voyage Clauses Hull (1/11/95), cl. 20.2; cited in F. D. Rose, Marine
Insurance: Law and Practice, (London: LLP, 2004) at 598, n. 139.
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f. Policy exceptions/exclusions
Policy exceptions also restrict insurance coverage and make policy holders
practically "prudent uninsured" for situations falling under the exceptions.
In terms of incentive effect, policy exceptions are similar to liability law
without liability insurance because in both situations a potentially liable
party bears the full brunt of liability arising from its conduct giving rise
to the liability. As an insured will have already paid the premium, the
financial consequence flowing from a policy exception will actually be
more severe. Policy exceptions will thus lead to better care at least in
preventing the conducts which trigger the exceptions.
The most important exception from the perspective of incentives
is that of any loss or liability "attributable to the wilful misconduct of
the insured. '94 Although this exception is well established in common
law and is enshrined in the marine insurance statutes, 95 it still appears
in P&I club rules and in cargo insurance clauses. 96 The simple rationale
behind this exception in property insurance (i.e., hull and cargo) is that
an insured should not be allowed to profit from its own wrongdoing.97
The most severe form of wilful misconduct in marine insurance context
is scuttling.98 Though it was a common insurance fraud in the past, it may
still occur especially when a low freight market brings down the price
of a ship much below its stated value in a valued policy.99 A situation of
scuttling may also give rise to cargo liability and thus may involve P&I
clubs for liability insurance.
94. MIA, supra note 37 at 53(2); UK-MIA, supra note 37 at s. 55 (2).
95. Ibid.
96. For example, see Institute Cargo Clauses (A), (B), (C), cl 4.1; Institute War Clauses (Cargo),
Strikes Clauses (Cargo), cl 3.1.
97. wilful misconduct of the master and crew to the prejudice of the shipowner amounts to
"barratry"; it is usually an insured peril and thus does not deprive the insured of the protection of
coverage. See O'Connor v. Merchants Marine Insurance Co. (1889), 16 S.C.R. 331; Spinney v. Ocean
Mutual Marine Insurance Co. (1890), 17 S.C.R. 326.
98. See P Samuel & Co. v. Dumas (1924), 18 LI. L. Rep. 211, [1924] All E.R. 66 (HL).
99. For a recent example, see Boyda v. Saxbee Insurance Agencies (1975) Ltd. (1984), 4 C.C.LI. 26
(B.C.C.A.). Hull insurances are almost invariably valued policies. Under a valued policy, the value of
subject-matter is conclusive evidence on valuation as between the insured and the insurer unless there
is any fraud: see MIA, supra note 37 at s. 30 (4).
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In contrast with wilful misconduct, mere negligence will not deprive
an insured of the benefit of either hull or liability insurance.10 Provision
of insurance in cases of negligence may seem to condone and encourage
negligent behaviours and may make the liability insurance appear inferior
to liability law in terms of incentives. This is, however, not the case in
reality. Although it is true that insurance provides protection against
liability for negligence and may on the face reduce the incentive effect of
liability law, there are various insurance and legal mechanisms, as we have
already seen, to maintain the incentives in the minds of the insured to use
care. Here the provision of insurance against liability for negligence can be
compared with the vicarious liability of an employer for the negligence of
its employees. In a vicarious liability situation, even though the negligent
employees do not have to pay directly for their negligence, this may not in
fact reduce the incentive effects of liability. law because the employer can
use the threat of firing or impose other less drastic monetary disciplines
on the employees.'
Similarly, an insurer can prevent the negligent conduct of the insured
by using financial disincentives through various insurance mechanisms
even though the insurer pays for the liability arising from the insured's
negligence. Also, when an employer has superior knowledge about the
possible risk and precaution to that of its employees, vicarious liability
may in fact lead to better care than if the employees directly bear the
liability.102 In a related manner, superior knowledge of the insurers brings
the actual care closer to optimal care than would be the case in the absence
of liability insurance.
100. Some insurance policies provide coverage not only for the negligence of employee in the so-
called "lnchmaree clause," but also for loss arising from the negligence of anyone including the
shipowners and charterers. For negligence of employees see MIA, supra note 37 at s. 53 (1); Century
Insurance Co. of Canada v Case Existological Laboratories Ltd [1983] 2 S.C.R. 47, 2 C.C.L.I.
172; C.C.R. Fishing Ltd. v. British Reserve Insurance Co., [1990] 1 S.C.R. 814, 43 C.C.L.I. I. For
negligence of the insured, see Russell v. Canadian General Insurance Co. (1999), I1 C.C.LI. (3d)
284 (Ont. Gen. Div.) and Atwood v. Canada (1985), 10 C.C.L.I. 62 (F.C.T.D.). In Williams v. Canada
(1984), 7 C.C.L.I. 198 (F.C.T.D.) the court stated at 211, "In the absence of express stipulations to the
contrary, negligence on the part of the assured or of a person for whom he is or may be responsible
does not exempt the insurer from liability though the loss is caused thereby, for one of the main objects
of insurance is to protect the assured against the consequences of negligence." [emphasis added]
101. Although an employer may legally sue the negligent employee to recover the money paid to a third
party, employers rarely pursue this course of action. See James, "Accident Liability Reconsidered,"
supra note I at 557, n. 24.
102. See Alan 0. Sykes, "The Economics of Vicarious Liability" (1984) 93 Yale L. J. 1231. See
also Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra note 15 at 188-89; Shavell, Foundations of Economic
Analysis of Law, supra note 6 at 233-36. See also Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents, supra note 7 at
164-165.
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Some policy exceptions/exclusions are not really intended to induce
care but to separate ordinary losses from the fortuitous ones. For example,
losses or liability from ordinary wear and tear, from ordinary breakage
and leakage, and from inherent vice or nature of the subject matter are
not usually covered. 103 Some other exceptions may have as their reason
the highly unpredictable or disproportionate risk such as exclusion of
coverage for war and strikes. However, for all these exceptions alternative
coverage may be available. As these exceptions have no role to play in
creating incentives, their provision by alternative insurance is not socially
undesirable and they are not relevant to our discussion here. However,
when some conduct may likely be a cause of concern in care level such as
the change of ownership/management, flag, and classification society of a
vessel, in order to prevent such conduct insurers may designate them as
exclusionary conduct for losses following such changes." n
g. Duty to mitigate loss (to sue and labour)
All the above insurance mechanisms mainly concern maintenance of
incentives to take care at the pre-accident stage. Once an insured peril is
either imminent or has already occurred, the insured can still take some
additional care to avert or minimize the loss arising from the insured
peril. In order to ensure that the insured take such care, marine insurance
policies generally contain a "sue and labour" clause, 105 which imposes on
the insured a duty to take reasonable steps to mitigate the loss or liability.
Failure to comply with this obligation will deprive the insured of indemnity
103. See Institute Cargo Clauses (A), (B), (C), cl 4.2; War Clauses (Cargo) and Strikes Clauses
(Cargo), cl 3.2; see also MIA, supra note 37 at s. 53 (2)(b); UK-MIA, supra note 37 at s. 55 (2)(c).
104. For example, the Canadian Board of Marine Underwriters (CBMU) Great Lakes Hull Clauses
(Sept. 1, 1971) provide at lines 229-232, "In the event of any change, voluntary or otherwise, in the
ownership or flag of the Vessel, or if the Vessel be placed under new management, or be chartered
on a bareboat basis or requisitioned on that basis, or if the Classification Society of the Vessel or
her class therein be changed, cancelled or withdrawn, then, unless the Underwriters agree thereto in
writing, this Policy shall automatically terminate...". Canadian Hulls (Pacific) Clauses (Sept. 1/91) at
lines 239-251, Institute Time Clauses Hulls (1/01/83) in cl 4, (1/11/95) in cl 5, and International Hull
Clauses (1/11/03) in cl 14 contain similar provisions.
105. The words "sue and labour" were first used in the Lloyd's S.G. policy, which contained a
clause requiring the insured "to sue, labour, and travel for, in and about the defence, safeguards, and
recovery of the said goods and merchandises, and ship, &c, or any part thereof, without prejudice
to this insurance...." [emphasis added]. Although the use of Lloyd's S.G. policy is now very rare, a
clause to the same effect continues to exist in all modem hull and cargo policies as well as in policies
for liability insurance. See the Great Lakes Hull Clauses (Sept. 1, 1971), the Canadian Hulls (Pacific)
Clauses (Sept 1/91), Institute Time Clauses Hulls (1/10/83), cl 13.1; (1/11/95), cl 11.1; International
Hull Clauses (01/11/03), cl 9.1; Institute Cargo Clauses (A), (B), and (C) (1/1/82), cl 16. See also
Strathy & Moore, Marine Insurance in Canada, supra note 54 at 183-84.
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for any loss or liability attributable to such failure."°6 Marine insurance
statutes also impose this obligation. 107 As this is both an insurance and
legal mechanism against moral hazard, there is no comparison between
this mechanism and liability law; duty to mitigate is part of liability law.
The insured is entitled to reimbursement of the expenses incurred in taking
such steps. °8 The enititlement is not affected by the failure of the steps
to achieve the intended result as long as they are reasonable under the
circumstances.
4. Negligence in the presence of insurance may be more costly
While financial burden from liability arises only after a loss, -financial
burden in the presence of insurance may be borne both before and after the
loss. An insured may have already paid its premium based on its expected
liability. Yet despite insurance if the insured has to pay personally for
liability due to a coverage-excluding conduct, it pays the premium and
at the same time bears the liability. In other words, in such a situation
it bears the financial burden twice. Even when insurance contains no
coverage exclusion or reduction, the insured's expected financial burden
(i.e., premium) in the presence of insurance is likely to be more than its
expected liability in the absence of proper care. This will be clear at the
end of the discussion in this section.
a. Insurance premium theoretically equals the expected liability
As mentioned before, theoretically an insured's premium should equal its
expected liability, presuming that there are no policy exclusions and under-
insurance. Yet, in practice, insurance premium will always be more than
the expected liability, given the liability of the insured remains unchanged
after it subscribes to insurance. This is because insurance premium includes
not only the expected liability but also the administrative cost and profit
elements of the insurers. 0 9 At this point, it may not be out of place to ask
why potentially liable parties would buy insurance when it may eventually
cost them more. The answer lies in the concept of risk aversion. Risk
106. Fudge v. Charter Marine Insurance Co., (1992), 97 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 91, 8 C.C.L.I. (2d) 252
(Nfld. S.C.); Strive Shipping Corp v. Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (Bermuda) Ltd. (The
Grecia.Express), [2002] EWHC 203 (Comm), [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 213 (Q.B.). See also Strathy
& Moore, Marine Insurance in Canada, ibid. at 181; Bennett, The Law of Marine Insurance, supra
note 39 at 750-53.
107. MIA, supra note 37 at ss. 79-80; UK-MIA, supra note 37 at s. 78.
108. The "sue and labour" clauses in the Lloyd's S.G. policy and modem hull and cargo policies
all contain express undertakings by the insurer to pay for such expenses. See supra note 105. The
provisions of MIA, supra note 37 at s. 79(1), and UK-MIA, supra note 37 at s. 7(l) reflect this marine
insurance practice.
109. See Shavell, Economic Analysis ofAccident Law, supra note 9 at 198.
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aversion is the tendency of a person to fear the loss of a bigger amount
with lower probability more than the loss of a smaller amount with higher
probability, even though the expected loss is the same in both cases. For
example, the loss of $100,000 with 1 percent probability and another loss
of $10,000 with 10 percent probability or a certain loss of $1,000 have
the same expected value, i.e., $1,000."'0 Yet, in the first instance, a risk-
averse person may be willing to pay its insurer more than $1000 (i.e., the
expected liability) in insurance premiums in order to transfer the risk to the
insurer, "1 ' even though the payment of the premium is certain and the odds
of being not liable are ninety-nine percent.
b. Insurance premium may be more or less than the pre-insurance
expected liability
The liability of the insureds, however, may increase or decrease after
they purchase insurance. It may increase if the problem of moral hazard
is serious. It may also decrease if the insurers can induce the insureds to
take better care than what the insureds would have taken in the absence
of insurance. As we have been maintaining in this paper that insurers
can induce a potentially liable person to take better care than what the
liability law alone would do, this raises the possibility that the insurance
premium can be less than the pre-insurance expected liability. This will
occur if the difference between the pre-insurance expected liability and
the post-insurance expected liability due to better care is more than the
insurer's administrative cost and profit combined. We have seen that the
possibility of better incentives and further reduction of loss can become
a reality because of the insurers' better information on. optimal care and
also because of their ability to offer better financial incentives through
insurance mechanisms. An example may be in order here.
If statistics compiled by the insurers from the loss history of the
insureds prove that most of the collisions occur due to the absence of
proper lookout, the insurers may deduce from the statistics that keeping a
crew member on the bridge of ships on a regular basis will substantially
cut down the number of collisions. " 2 Even though employing an additional
crew member for the proper lookout would be efficient from the perspective
110. See Pauly, "The Economics of Moral Hazard," supra note 3 at 532; Shavell, Economic Analysis
ofAccident Law, supra note 9 at 186-87; Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis, supra note 6 at
258.
I1l. The amount an insured pays the insurer above the expected loss/liability is known as "risk
premium": Steven S. Stephens, "The Consequences of Expansionary Workers' Compensation Policy"
(1995) 46 Lab. L.J. 17 at 26.
112. This example is a modified version of the finding of the Norwegian P&I Club Gard AS; see
Gards Claims Statistics, supra note 76 at 18-19.
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of long term loss/liability, an insured may not see its net benefit due to its
lack of information about the probability and magnitude of loss caused by
this factor alone. On the other hand, the insurers' research may show that
the employment of an additional crew member would reduce the current
probability of average collision liability of $100,000, for instance, from
10 percent to 5 percent (i.e., from expected liability of $ 10,000 to $5,000).
If the wage of the additional member is, say $3,000, i.e., less than the
difference of liability before and after employing the crew member," 3 the
employment would bring a net saving of $2,000. In other words, in the
absence of insurance, due to lack of information, the insured took less
care and its expected liability was $10,000. In the presence of insurance,
the expected liability is now $5,000. If the insurer's administrative cost
and profit amount to $1,000, the insurance premium would be now
$6,000, much less than the pre-insurance expected liability of $10,000.
The insured's net saving would be $1,000 (i.e., $10,000 pre-insurance
expected liability minus $6,000 for insurance premium and $3,000 for
wage of the additional crew member). This example shows that despite
the additional administrative costs of liability insurance, the existence of
liability insurance may not only lead to better care and precaution but may
also bring net savings for the insured.
The above example can also be used to show that negligence in the
presence of insurance is more costly than in its absence. The insured's
expected liability before insurance was $10,000, but its insurance premium
would be $11,000 ($10,000 in expected liability plus $1,000 for insurer's
cost and profit) if it did not employ the additional crew member."4 Not
employing the additional crew here would amount to negligence and
the insurance premium would be more expensive than the pre-insurance
expected liability. As the hiring of an extra crew member at a cost of $3,000
would reduce the premium from $11,000 to $6,000, the insured being a
rational individual would employ the extra crew member. Whether the
insured in fact employed the required number of crew or not, the insurer
may easily verify.
Among the insurance mechanisms, rate variance would be the most
effective tool here to motivate the insured to adequately staff the ship. For
additional guarantee, the insurer may make it an express warranty in the
insurance contract that a certain number of crew members must always
113. The difference is $5,000. Before appointment of the additional crew member the expected
liability was $10,000 (10% multiplied by $100,000) and it would be $5,000 (5% x $100,000) after the
appointment.
114. See generally Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis, supra note 6 at 264-65.
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be present in the ship or on the bridge." 5 With regard to the remaining
5 percent of collision probability in above example, certain precautions
may reduce the probability further."6 If the insurer cannot observe those
aspects of precaution, it may incorporate in the policy deductibles and/or
policy limits to maintain incentives in the minds of the insureds. As we
have seen earlier, deductible and policy limit may induce an insured to
spend more on care than merely the expected value of the deductible and
liability ceiling. Because, by definition, an insured is a risk-averse party,
it would rather spend more on care than bear the burden of deductible or
liability exceeding the policy limit even though the expected value of the
burden is less than the cost of care. 117
5. Additional reasons why insurance may lead to better care
a. Insurance facilitates research and innovation on loss reduction
The above example also shows that insurers can classify the causes of loss
.and then guide the insureds to adopt the appropriate precautionary steps
to control future losses. There may be as-yet undiscovered but better cost-
efficient techniques to reduce losses. Discovery of those techniques requires
investment in research and development. An insurer is in a better position
than the individual insureds to undertake this task not only because of the
insurer's ability to spread the cost of research over all the insureds but also
its superior knowledge on the causes of loss." 8 There is no comparison
here between insurers and courts. Courts' suggestions in their decisions on
various aspects of care would be limited to only the known techniques. In
fact, courts' knowledge on some known techniques may be even inferior
to that of the liable parties when they are of a technical and complicated
nature. Although courts may seek expert testimony, the knowledge of an
expert is also confined to the existing techniques. H9
A possible disincentive to an insurer's investment in research and
innovation is the fact that the competitors of the insurer may benefit
115. See, for example, De Hahn v. Hartley (1786), 99 E.R. 1130 (K.B.), where the insurer required
the presence of fifty crew members, but the ship had only forty-six at the beginning of the voyage.
Although the ship had fifty-two crew members at the time of the insured peril, the insurance was held
voidable.
116. The probability of collision incidents may never be zero either because no optimal care is
possible or because there is always some unavoidable accidents due to the elements of the sea. See
generally Calabresi, The Costs ofAccidents, supra note 7 at 17-18.
117. Spending more than the expected deductible or the amount above the policy limit will not be
undesirable as long as such spending is less than the total expected loss or liability.
118. See Abraham, Distributing Risk, supra note 3 at 15-16. See also J. Kehne, "Encouraging Safety
Through Insurance-Based Incentives: Financial Responsibility for Hazardous Wastes" (1986) 96 Yale
L. J. 403 at 407 [Kehne, "Encouraging Safety"].
119. See supra note 34.
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from its research and innovation without incurring the corresponding
cost. 120 This may be overcome by coordination and joint undertaking of
research initiatives by the insurers. An ideal example in this regard is the
International Group of P&I clubs. The Group consists of thirteen large P&I
clubs and covers over 90 percent of the world's ocean-going tonnage.'
The members of the clubs belonging to the Group benefit from the shared
experience and exchange of information among clubs on various common
issues of concern.
b. Insurance also helps insureds to know better about optimal care
This is an obvious point. There is no use of insurers obtaining information
on optimal care and on better techniques to prevent or minimize loss if the
insureds are not aware of those techniques. An insurer needs to convey
the acquired information to the insureds so that they can take optimal
care and employ the techniques in the insured activities. As we have seen
throughout the paper, better information combined with stronger financial
incentives through various insurance mechanisms leads to improved
care and safety in the presence of liability insurance. This only occurs in
practice if the insured knows what the optimal care is and what financial
benefits it would receive from the insurer by exercising optimal care. 22
c. Insurer failure to create incentives may affect the very survival of its
business
While failure of a court to accurately determine optimal care in a liability
situation has no effect on the continued existence of the court, such failure
by an insurer, if regular, may threaten the very survival of the insurer's
business in a competitive market.'23 As we have seen, calculation of the
correct premium rate depends on proper determination of expected loss/
liability of an insured. Insurers constantly need to assess each insured's
expected liability and then set and adjust the premium accordingly to reflect
the expected liability. If potential increase in the premium rate following
a loss caused by negligence is more than the cost of care, the insured
would take care and prevent the loss from occurring. On the other hand,
if the insurer does not adjust the premium and roughly charge the same
premium to all insureds, the insurer will attract high-risk insureds and will
120. See Abraham, Distributing Risk, supra note 3 at 78-79; Shavell, Foundations of Economic
Analysis, supra note 6 at 36-37.
121. Mark Tilley, "The Origin and Development of the Mutual Shipowners' Protection & Indemnity
Associations"(1986) 17 J. Mar. L & Com. 261.
122. See Abraham, Distributing Risk, supra note 3 at 73-74.
123. Kehne, "Encouraging Safety," supra note I 18 at 412. See also Calabresi, The Costs ofAccidents,
supra note 7 at 61-62.
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cause low-risk insureds to leave the insurance pool. Left with only high-
risk insureds, insurers would either have to charge very high premiums
or incur substantial loss. Both options will lead to loss of business and
possible bankruptcy of the insurer.
The reason for this in the second option is obvious. The reason in the
first option is that each relatively low-risk insured has to pay more than
its expected loss to cover for relatively high-risk members in the pool;
the low-risk insureds would be better off either to self-insure or to seek
coverage elsewhere, which they will do in a competitive market. This
phenomenon is known as "adverse selection" in insurance literature'2 4
and was the cause of the demise of the nineteenth century hull insurance
clubs. "'25 To avoid this phenomenon and to induce each individual insured
to take care, insurers today not only separate their insureds and the risks
they bring into groups and classes'26 but also vary the premium rate for
different insureds under the same group/class.
III. Empirical evidence
a. Marine insurance
Since marine liability insurance is as old as maritime liability law itself, it
is hard to find statistics to show the difference in loss rate, if any, before
and after the liability insurance in order to prove the positive impact of
insurance on incentives. However, there are statistics in many areas of
liability, where the claims for losses are on the decline due to the proper
identification by the insurers of the causes of loss or injury. For example,
the statistics for 1993-2003 on liability for physical injury to crew
members in vessels insured by the Norwegian P&I club Gard show that
the average claim decreased from about US$25,000 to $15,000.27 Not only
the average claim amount, but also the total number of claims was on the
decline despite the increasing tonnage of the club's insured fleets. 28 This
was partly due to Gard's finding from the claim history the main causes of
124. See Abraham, Distributing Risk, supra note 3 at 67-68.
125. With the removal of monopoly on marine insurance in 1824 in the UK, the marine insurance
market became more competitive and well-built ships received offers of better premium rates from
market insurers than from the mutual hull insurance clubs with fixed premium rates. As a result, hull
insurance clubs were left with "rust buckets" and were eventually dissolved: Bennett, The Law of
Marine Insurance, supra note 39 at 11, n. 42.
126. While in marine insurance determination of the class of a ship or its assignment to a particular
risk group mainly depends on its physical strength, in automobile insurance risk classification may be
based on the age and gender of an insured, among other factors.
127." See Gards Claims Statistics, supra note 76 at 24. However, crew claims in Gard represent the
largest claim category. in terms of liability payment. Most crew claims involve illness and disease.
128. Ibid.
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crew injuries, which are mostly preventable. 2 9 Similarly, the incidents of
and total liability for collisions are also in decline.'30
On the other hand, statistics of the same P&I club on 119 major cargo
claims between 1996 to 2000 show an upward trend in the value of the
average claim. These statistics, however, have to be considered in light
of the facts that 1) these claims concern liability exceeding US$150,000
each; 2) increasing value of the cargoes has been a factor; 3) no allowance
has been made for inflation; and 4) there was no mention about the total
claims per year.'3' Even when liability claims are increasing, it does not
necessarily prove that there was no incentive effect of liability insurance
on precautionary steps. An increase in liability claims may be due to
economic as well as legal inflation, i.e., application of new legal doctrines
increasing the amount of liability paid by defendants or their insurers. 13 2
Another possible reason for increase of claims is the reduced incentives
due to limitation of liability principle in maritime law.'33 In other words, if
all these factors are accounted for, there is a strong possibility that liability
arising from negligence is on the decline because of the existence of
liability insurance.
b. Non-marine insurance
There are also proofs in other areas of liability where the insurers'
research and increased incentives by insurance mechanisms led to
reduction in the incidents of loss and the consequent liability. In 1930s
and 1940s insurers' inspection and research improved elevators' and
boilers' safety and reduced accident rates. 34 There is also evidence that
industrial accident rate, particularly death rate, declined sharply due in
part to incentives created by insurers, 13' although the claims for non-fatal
injuries increased. 36 As for automobile insurance, the incentive effect of
liability insurance on accidents may be indirectly proved by the increase
of fatalities in no-fault liability system, i.e., where third party liability is
129. See ibid. at 25.
130. Ten-year statistics (1992 to 2002) on collision liability in Gard show that collision liability
accounts for 3.1 percent in terms of number of all P&I claims but 12 percent in terms of value.
However, the average cost of collision liability is on the rise. Ibid. at 18.
131. Ibid. at 3-4.
132. See Abraham, Distributing Risk, supra 3 note at 46.
133. See Billah, "Economic Analysis of Limitation of Shipowners' Liability," supra note 77.
134. James, "Accident Liability Reconsidered," supra note I at 561.
135. Ibid.
136. See Stephens, "The Consequences of Expansionary Workers' Compensation Policy," supra note
111 at 24.
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either completely or partially eliminated.'37 This may, however, simply
be due to the absence of liability rather than liability insurance. Yet high
liability insurance premium for more accident-prone drivers especially for
young male drivers contributes to the reduction of number of accidents at
least by delaying their driving activity.'38
Conclusion
Liability laws may fail to produce optimal care for various reasons including
the courts' lack of information on optimal care. While liability insurance
may cause moral hazard and reduce the incentives effect of liability law,
insurers' superior information on optimal care combined with their ability
to produce stronger financial incentives through rate variance and coverage
restrictions will bring the insureds' care level closer to optimal care. The
fact that liability insurance can produce better solicitude than liability law
alone may have significance in the very future of liability law in certain
areas. With widespread first party insurance the role of liability law as
a source of compensation is decreasing in significance. The justification
of liability law mainly hinges on its effect in creating incentives in the
minds of potentially liable parties to exercise care. Even if this benefit of
liability law may not sometimes clearly outweigh the administrative costs
associated with maintaining the liability system,'39 creation of additional
incentives through liability insurance may tip the balance in favour of
liability law. Without the liability law, there would be no liability insurance;
and without liability insurance, the possible additional incentives from it
would be lost. This seems to be the case in the no-fault liability system. 0
137. See Alma Cohen & Rajeev Dehejia, "The Effect of Automobile Insurance and Accident Liability
Laws on Traffic Fatalities" (2004) 47 J. L. & Econ. 357; Elisabeth M. Landes, "Insurance Liability and
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J. L. & Econ. 49.
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note 137 at 49; Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, ibid. at 201-202; Shavell, Foundations of Economic
Analysis, supra note 6 at 281-82.
140. The absence of liability in such no-fault accident regimes has been partially blamed for the
increase of automobile accidents. See Cohen & Dehejia, "The Effect of Automobile Insurance and
Accident Liability Laws on Traffic Fatalities," supra note 137; Landes, "Insurance Liability and
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